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I Comments

I

Nevada Department of Human Resources v.

Hibbs: Does Application of Section 5
Represent a Fundamental Change in the
Immunity Abrogation Rules of "New
Federalism," or Have the Burdens Simply
Shifted?
Gabriel R. MacConaill*
I.

Introduction

The principle that the people are represented by two distinct
sovereigns lies at the very heart of the United States Constitution.1 The
allocation of power between the states and the federal government is
embodied in the doctrine of federalism, the "oldest question of
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; BA The University of North Carolina at Charlotte summa cum laude,
2002. The author wishes to thank Susan Treleaven, Stephen Blakney, Noah Blakney and
Joanna Litt for their tireless support.
1. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-06 (1819) (describing
the federal government as a Union expressly granted powers by the people, where the
states retain all power not granted).
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constitutional law." 2 Fundamental disagreements over the precise
operation of federalism in the Constitution 3 have not only led to the Civil
War, but also created confusion and cyclical change in the majority
position of the Supreme Court.4
Very often, the federalism battle has been fought over the
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 5 Ostensibly, state immunity
from private suit is guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 6 As a
result, the judicial debate regarding state sovereign immunity usually
centers on different interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment.7
Since 1995, the Supreme Court has promulgated a "new federalist"
theme, under which state sovereign immunity is almost absolutely
protected.8 And yet, to the surprise of many, the Court recently held in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs9 that Congress had
properly abrogated state immunity under Section Five of the Fourteenth

2. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
3. Compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820-21 (1995)
(stating that the Constitution provided for a national government that received its
sovereignty from the people, not the states), with id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each
individual State .. "), and THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 291(James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (claiming that the federal structure allows the states to protect citizens
from federal tyranny).
4.

See DANIEL A.

FARBER ET AL.,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW:

THEMES

FOR THE

CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 763-64 (2d ed. 1998).
5. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2001)
(recognizing that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to a valid
exercise of constitutional power).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Id.
7. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.3 (3d 1999) (setting out the
three major competing theories on what the Eleventh Amendment means). The current
Supreme Court majority has supported a theory of state sovereign immunity that views
the Eleventh Amendment as a subject matter restriction upon suits against the states. Id.
A minority of justices have advanced the theory that state immunity only exists when a
private suit is brought under diversity jurisdiction. Id. Chemerinsky describes a third
possibility: the Eleventh Amendment embodies the English Common Law notion that the
King can do no wrong thus, state sovereignty may not be abrogated. See id.
8. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743
(2002) (barring administrative adjudication of private suit); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (severing parts of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (severing parts of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding parts of the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 unconstitutional); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1986) (holding that the Indian Gaming Act could not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
9. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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Amendment.' 0 Based on the evidence before Congress, the Hibbs Court
found that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA") 1 was a
proper remedy for state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2 For
the first time, the Court authorized abrogation under Section Five., 3 The
Hibbs decision may signal a different path for "new federalism."
This comment focuses on the reasoning and decision of Hibbs in the
context of the historic battle over state sovereign immunity. Part II
analyzes the language and history of the Eleventh Amendment, dual
sovereignty, and past attempts at abrogation of immunity under the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part
III examines the possibility that the "change" in Section Five
jurisprudence is only one of shifting burdens. In conclusion, this
comment asserts that the Court continues to exhort federalism at the
possible expense of individual rights, although after Hibbs some cases
will require the states, and not Congress, to bear the burden of proof.
II.
A.

Background
Etiology of Sovereign Immunity
1.

The Eleventh Amendment: Pre-history and the Evolution of
Almost Absolute Immunity

Prior to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts
clearly had jurisdiction over suits brought against a state by a citizen of
another state.' 4 In a famous four-to-one decision, the Supreme Court
ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear a suit brought by a citizen of South
Carolina against the State of Georgia to collect on Revolutionary War

10.
11.

See id. at 737; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54

(2000)).
12.

See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-34 (describing evidence of the stereotypical view that

women are the primary family caregivers, and the resulting discrimination against men).
13. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. ofthe Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001)
(rejecting Congressional attempt to use Section Five to abrogate state immunity under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel 528 U.S. at 90-92 (holding that the Age
discrimination in Employment Act was not a Constitutional exercise of Section Five).
Section Five provides that: "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
14. The Constitution provides the federal judiciary with original jurisdiction over
cases "between a State and Citizens of another State .... U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 394 (citing The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
73, 80, at § 13 which codified the diversity jurisdiction provided in Article III).
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bonds. 15 The Chisholm v. Georgia decision created an uproar because
the states generally could not afford to pay back their Revolutionary War
debts. 16 In a particularly intense example of the reaction to Chisholm,
Georgia passed a statute that made it a felony to attempt to enforce the
Court's decision. 17
Less than three weeks after the controversial decision, the Eleventh
Amendment was approved by both houses of Congress. 8 For almost a
century, the only Supreme Court case to interpret the new Amendment
labeled it a narrow grant of sovereign immunity. 19 In Cohens v.
Virginia,20 Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the Eleventh
Amendment did not preclude federal jurisdiction over a federal question
raised by a citizen against his own state. 2 ' In fact, the text of the
Eleventh Amendment only prohibits suits against states brought in
diversity.22
The narrow reading of the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition was
abandoned by the Court when it was faced with a state war-debt
controversy for the second time.23 In Hans v. Louisiana,2 4 the plaintiff, a
citizen of Louisiana, sued the state to enforce the terms of a war bond

15.
16.

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793).
See FARBER ET AL., supra note 4, at 851. See also CHEMERINSKY supra note 7, at

395 (citing CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 99

(1922)).
17. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 395 (citing PETER W. Low & JOHN C.
JEFFERIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 810 (4th

ed. 1998)). The punishment for attempting to enforce federal jurisdiction was "death,
without the benefit of clergy by being hanged." Id.
18. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 671 n.34
(2002).
19. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821). "We think a case
arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of
the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." Id.
20. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
21.

See FARBER ET AL., supra note 4, at 851 (describing Marshall's Cohens

decision). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall's
famous opinion in which he asserts the Supreme Court's power to "say what the law is,"
giving the Supreme Court enormous authority and final jurisdiction).
22. The Eleventh Amendment is written to exclude extending the judicial power of
the United States to any suit brought against a state by "Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI. Textually, the
Eleventh Amendment erases the diversity jurisdiction against the states granted under
Article III, however, that Article also contains a broad grant of federal question
jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending Supreme Court jurisdiction to all cases
"arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States .....
23. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
24. 134 U.S. 1.
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Louisiana argued that the Supreme Court did not have
debt. 25
jurisdiction to hear a suit against a state without that state's permission.26
The plaintiff attempted to avoid the Eleventh Amendment altogether by
basing his claim on an alleged state violation of the Constitution's
Contract Clause found in Article I, Section 10.27 Justice Bradley
determined that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
Hans's federal question controversy because the purpose and spirit of the
Eleventh Amendment went beyond its literal language.2 8
Confusion over what the Hans decision actually means continues to
this day. 29 Though confusion over the decision's meaning persists, it is
clear that the practical effect of Hans was to extend Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suits brought against states by their own
citizens. 30 Application of Hans and its postulates has resulted in a
judicial grant of nearly absolute state immunity.31

2.

The Commerce Clause: A Short-Lived Threat to State
Sovereign Immunity

a.

Congress may Abrogate State Immunity 32Using the Commerce
Clause: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

The federal commerce power 33 gives positive authority to
Congress, 34 and has been judicially interpreted as an implied limitation
25. Id.at 1.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. Article I, Section 10 contains a broad prohibition on state action: "No State
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payments of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 10.
28. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 21. The Court's decision to construe the Eleventh
Amendment as a broad grant of immunity is also the product of the chaos produced by
Chisholm. See id. at 11.
29. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (the majority opinion
and both dissenting opinions provided conflicting views on the meaning of Hans).
30. See id. at 54 (confirming the presupposition in Hans that the Eleventh
Amendment reinforces individual state sovereignty and prohibits individual suits without
the state's consent). See also Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting the Federalist No. 81 "[iut is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without [the state's] consent.").
31. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 4, at 853 (discussing the extension of Hans
immunity to cases in admiralty and controversies with foreign nations).
32. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
3.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
34. The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power: "To regulate
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A plurality of the Supreme Court decided in

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 36 that Congress could abrogate state

immunity from federal suit through Article 1.37
Justice Brennan reasoned for the plurality 38 that the Commerce
Clause gave Congress power while at the same time taking power away
from the states. 39 By ratifying the Constitution, the states agreed to be
sued when Congress acted under its granted plenary powers.4 ° In
addition, Brennan noted that Congress had a distinct power to abrogate
under the Commerce Clause because of the Clause's unique dormant
effect.41
The Court was deeply divided over the decision to allow abrogation
of immunity under Article 1.42 Four justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-took the position that the
Eleventh Amendment provided broad constitutional sovereign
immunity.4 3 Those justices would later be joined by Justice Thomas to
44
form a majority in favor of providing state immunity from federal suit.
In dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that the Hans v. Louisiana
precedent provided for straightforward application of fundamental
principles of federalism.

45

At the very foundation of federalism,

according to Justice Scalia, lies the notion that the states have retained
sovereign immunity.46
After pointing out the plurality's alleged
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian

Tribes." Id.
35. See FARBER El AL., supra note 4, at 858-63 (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and the origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
36. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).

37. See id. at 3-4.
38. Vote counting gets a bit confusing because Justice White separately concurred,
disagreeing with Brennan's Article I abrogation reasoning, but not providing a clear
alternative. Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
39. Id. at 16. Brennan was relying on the same reasoning as had been used to
abrogate state immunity under Section Five in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
40. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14.
41. Id. at 20; see also FARBER ET AL., supra note 4, at 858-63 (discussing Dormant
Commerce Clause power).
42. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 46 (1996) (overruling
Union Gas by holding that the Commerce Clause could not be used to abrogate state
sovereign immunity).
45. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. See id. This foundational principle seems very similar to the states-rights view
that Maryland proposed in its losing effort in McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 327-28 (1819).
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misunderstanding of federalism, Scalia found error in the way Justice
47
Brennan analogized Commerce Clause and Section Five abrogation.
Justice Scalia agreed that the Eleventh Amendment's principle of
sovereign immunity is limited by the subsequent Fourteenth
Amendment, which directly inhibits state action.48 Justice Scalia sought,
however, to edify the plurality as to the difference between the powers
granted in Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Scalia opined that
if Congress had the ability to nullify state sovereign immunity whenever
it wanted under the Commerce Clause, the result would render the entire
doctrine of sovereign immunity without merit. 50 According to Justice
Scalia, if state sovereign immunity is to retain the value provided in the
federalist structure of the Constitution, its abrogation must only be had
by constitutional provisions that expressly implicate the states.51
b.

Congress may not Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity Using
the Commerce Clause: Union Gas52 Overruled

Seven years passed before the Court resolved the rift exposed by
Union Gas53 by overruling the plurality's holding.54 In Seminole Tribe v.
55 a majority of the Court agreed that Union Gas56 was wrongly
Florida,

47. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (stating that it was a mistake to compare a substantive
limitation upon the states, the Fourteenth Amendment, with a limited positive grant of
federal authority, the Commerce Clause).
48. Id.
49. Justice Scalia notes that "state immunity from suit in federal courts is a structural
component of federalism, and not merely a default position that can be altered by action
of Congress pursuant to its Article I powers." Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). According to Scalia, the plurality failed in relying on Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, because that decision upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Commerce
Clause. See id. at 41. Fitzpatrick, stated Scalia, held only that the principle of state
sovereignty could be limited by subsequent provisions directly aimed at the states. See
id. at 41-42. Thus nothing in the Fitzpatrick reasoning supports limiting the principle of
sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment by reference to "antecedent
provisions of the Constitution" such as Article I. See id. at 42.
50. See id. at 42. Here, Justice Scalia has expanded the first rationale provided by
Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion to a logical conclusion. See id. This conclusion
is unacceptable to Scalia because it not only stands in derogation of sovereign immunity,
but also could very well signal the end of federalism itself. See id. at 41-42.
51. See id. at 42.
52. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
53. Id. The court heard a few Eleventh Amendment cases in this period, but none
were based on the Union Gas holding. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
54. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
55. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
56. 491 U.S. 1.
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decided.57 The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, expressly
overruled Union Gas and adopted much of the reasoning Justice Scalia
had articulated seven years earlier.58
Seminole Tribe presented a conflict over the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act 59 that had been enacted under the Indian Commerce
Clause,60 a constitutionally granted power.6 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist
seized the opportunity to analogize the Indian Commerce power and the
Commerce power, providing a foundation for review of the Union Gas
precedent.62 The Chief Justice divided his opinion into two parts, asking
first whether Congress had intended to abrogate state immunity, and
second whether this abrogation was a valid exercise of congressional
power.6 3
The first question was answered in the affirmative, without detailed
reasoning or analysis.64 The Court then answered the second question by
holding that the abrogation was not a valid exercise of congressional
power because the Commerce Clause could not be used to diminish a
state's right to immunity from suit. 65 The decision in Seminole Tribe
effectively limits congressional attempts at abrogation of state sovereign
immunity to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 6
B.

The Direct FederalPower to Abrogate: Section Five of the
FourteenthAmendment
1.

Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is an Affirmative
Grant of Federal Power Over the States

Before the rise and fall of Commerce Clause abrogation, the Court
determined that Section Five provides Congress with the affirmative
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 67 Authored by then-Justice
57. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
58. See id.
59. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
61. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
62. See id. at 60 (the petitioners actually provided for this analogy in their brief by
appealing to the plurality's Commerce Clause holding in Union Ga.-).
63. Id. at 55.

64. Id. at 57. The Chief Justice found that frequent references to the "State" in the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act were clear evidence of Congress' intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Id.
65. Id. at 72-73. Even though the conflict in Seminole Tribe actually involved the
Indian Commerce Clause, the essential holding encompasses the Commerce Clause as the
Chief Justice found the two indistinguishable. See id. at 63.
66. See id. at 72-73.
67. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
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Rehnquist, the majority opinion in Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer 68 concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment was in and of itself a restriction on state
authority.69 Fitzpatrickwas also the first case in which a state attempted
to use the Eleventh Amendment to avoid abrogation of its immunity by a
statute enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment.70
In Fitzpatrick, a group of Connecticut state employees brought suit
against the state alleging sexual discrimination through the statutory
provision of retirement benefits. 71 The Court found: "[t]here is no
dispute that in enacting the 1972 Amendments to Title VII to extend
coverage to the States as employers, Congress exercised its power under
[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 72 The ability of Congress to
express its intent to abrogate under Section Five seems liberally drawn
here, as it is found in legislative history, and not in the text of the statute
itself.73 Fundamentally, the Fitzpatrick decision provides that the
Fourteenth Amendment is a tool by which Congress may inhibit and
sanction state action.74
The majority left the door open, however, for further state claims of
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.75 In a footnote, the Court
hinted to the states that Connecticut, while claiming Eleventh
Amendment protection, did "not contend that the substantive portions of
Title VII as applied here are not a proper exercise of congressional
authority under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76 This
innocuous footnote near the end of the majority opinion foreshadowed
68. 427 U.S. 445.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 452-53.
71. Id. at 448. The claimants were relying on amendments to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, passed in 1972, which provided that federal courts had the authority
to issue monetary damages against any state that discriminated on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. at 447-48 (citing Section 703(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 225, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV)).
72. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 n.9 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971); S.
REP. No. 92-415, at 10-11 (1971); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
73. See id. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7 at 438-40. In a subsequent
description of the standard, the Court determined that Congress must make its intent to
abrogate "unmistakably clear." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985) (holding that Rehabilitation Act of 1973 did not authorize suits against the states).
The Court has also required that Congress's intent to abrogate be very explicit. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7 at 438 (describing the holding in Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332 (1979)).
74. See Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 452. "In this Title VII case the 'threshold fact of
congressional authorization' to sue the state employer is clearly present." Id. (citing
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)).
75. See Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456 n. 11.
76. Id.
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the issue that now determines the validity of congressional enactments
under Section Five.77 The Court's statement suggests that the Eleventh
Amendment may be viewed as a substantive limit on congressional
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.78
2.

a.

Limitation on Congressional Attempts to Abrogate Through
Section Five: The Congruence and Proportionality
Requirement
79
Describing the Test: City of Boerne v. Flores

The Court set forth standards in City of Boerne v. Flores80 to
determine whether Congress's exercise of Section Five power is valid. 8'
City of Boerne involved the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed
by Congress to limit governments' ability to burden an individual's right
to exercise his or her religious beliefs. 82 Before deciding the validity of
Congress's use of Section 5 power, the majority sought to define the
nature of this power. 83 The Court determined that Section Five provided
Congress with broad authority to act in a preventative and remedial
capacity.8 4 Further, Congress would be permitted, in proscribing state
violations, to intrude upon areas of authority not necessarily
unconstitutional and "previously reserved to the states. '8' 5
Despite this seemingly broad grant of power, the Court established
defined limitations on congressional authority.86 After holding that
77. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-87 (2000) (holding
portions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act outside the substantive grant of
Section Five authority).
78. See Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456 n. 11.
79. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

80.
81.

Id.
See id. at 536 (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act could not

abrogate state sovereign immunity through Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.)

82. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a),(b) (2000). The Act prohibited state law from
substantially burdening the exercise of religion unless such laws could pass strict
scrutiny. See id.

83. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
84. Id. at 524.
85. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
86. See id. at 519. The Court, enforcing the notion that it is the province of the
judicial branch to interpret the Constitution, held that Congress could not decide what the
Fourteenth Amendment means. Id. "The design of the Amendment and the text of
[Section] 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States." Id. See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 445 (describing Boerne as providing that Congress can
only enact remedies for rights already recognized by the courts, that Congress may not
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Congress could not decide the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
limitations, the Court turned to the proper standard of review.8 7 The
Boerne opinion is well-known for establishing the "congruence and
88
proportionality" test as the appropriate yardstick in Section Five cases.
The test requires that Congress identify a "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end." 89 The Court found that it was "apparent
from the text of the Amendment," that a Congressional measure lacking
such a connection would be substantive in nature. 9° Viewing the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority found further support for its
earlier holding that Congress could not act substantively, and that the
Fourteenth Amendment provided only preventative or remedial power.91
b.

Applying the Boerne Test: Striking Down Federal Attempts at
Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity

Prior to the May 2003 Hibbs decision, the Court had three
opportunities to apply the congruence and proportionality test set forth in
City of Boerne to congressional attempts at abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.9 2 In the first case, Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,93 the Court held that provisions
94
of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
were unconstitutional because they allowed patent holders to sue
infringing states.95 The Court dismissed claims that Congress had the

"create new rights or expand the scope of rights.").
87. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
88. See id. at 520.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 520-25. The legislative history behind the Fourteenth Amendment shows
that a more liberally phrased initial draft was tabled for two months. Id. at 521-22. The
second attempt at wording the Fourteenth Amendment which provided that "[tihe
congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article," was a grant of remedial instead of plenary power, according to the Court. See id.
at 522 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2286).
92. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
93. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
94. Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230. (1992). The Clarification Act was passed
to clearly express congressional intent to abrogate state immunity from patent
infringement claims in response to Chew v. California,893 F.2d 331 (1990) and similar
federal decisions finding that the previous patent laws did not contain the "requisite
statement of intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from infringement suits."
FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 631-32.
95. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 636, 647.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 109:3

authority to abrogate under the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause
by referring to the clear rule from Seminole Tribe that Article I contains
no abrogation authority.96 In determining the validity of Congress's
Section Five power,
the Court focused on legislative history as it had
97
Boerne.
in
done
The Court found that the Patent Remedy Act did not respond to a
history of constitutional rights deprivation. 98 In essence, the Court
determined that Congress had identified no true constitutional violation
requiring a remedy. 99 Further, from a procedural standpoint, Congress
had "barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent
infringement."' 00
Thus, Congress failed on two fronts:
by not
identifying a specific constitutional wrong, and by not limiting the scope
of the Act to state actions which would presumably be
unconstitutional. 101
In the second case, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 10 2 individual
suits were brought against Florida under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA").1 °3 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, ruled that the ADEA failed the congruence and proportionality
test, and was not a valid congressional exercise of Section Five. 10 4 Again
Congress had passed legislation which
"prohibit[ed] very little conduct
'0 5
unconstitutional."
held
be
to
likely
Significantly, Justice O'Conner found the ADEA incongruent
because of the nature of age-based classifications as opposed to gender96. Id. at 636. "Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I Powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act
cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause." Id.
97. See id. at 643-46.
98. Id. at 645 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 at 526 (1997)). In fact,
the Court determined that "Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response
to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution." Id. at 645-46.
99. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 646. "[I]dentifying the targeted constitutional
wrong or evil is still a critical part of our [Section] 5 calculus because '[s]trong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one."'
Id. at 646 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530).
100. FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 643.
101. See id. at 645-47. Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the Court had never
before required Congress to identify a pattern of state deprivation of constitutional rights.
Id. at 660 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens admitted that Congress did not review
available state remedies, however he saw this requirement as ironic since Congress had
long ago preempted the entire field of patent infringement cases. Id. at 657-58 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
102. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
104. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83.
105. Id. at 88,
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based or race-based classifications. 10 6 Whereas state classifications
based on race must satisfy the strictest of scrutiny, and state
classifications based on gender must survive heightened scrutiny, agebased discrimination is permissible as long as the state can satisfy the
highly deferential rational basis test.'0 7 The ADEA did not fail, however,
solely because it prohibited very little unconstitutional conduct; Justice
O'Connor went on to examine
the legislative history to determine the
08
statute's proportionality. 1
According to the Court, Congress had "virtually no reason to
believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally
discriminating against their employees on the basis of age."10 9 Because
the proportionality test provided in Boerne requires that prophylactic
responses be measured against the evil they seek to remedy," 0
Congress's failure to identify a constitutional violation precludes
abrogation of immunity through Section Five."' As a result of its
"indiscriminate scope" based on a lack of "evidence of widespread age
discrimination," the ADEA was held to be both incongruent and
disproportionate, therefore failing the Boerne test as an invalid exercise
12
of Section Five power."
The third, and final, pre-Hibbs Supreme Court case to apply the
Boerne congruence and proportionality test analyzed Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")." 3 In Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garret,1 4 the Court was faced with the
question of "whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority
by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages
under the ADA." ' 1 5 Not in dispute, however, was the fact that Congress
had unequivocally intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.116
106. Id. at 83-84.
107. See id. at 83. "Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race
or gender, cannot be characterized as 'so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy."' Id. (quoting Clerburne v. Clerburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,

440 (1985)).
108. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
109. Id. at 91.
110. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 at 530 (1997).
111. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
112. Id. Justice O'Connor went on to inform the plaintiffs that in every state of the
Union they retained a right under state statutory authority to sue their employers for such
discrimination. Id. at 91-92.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2000).
114. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
115. Id.at 364.
116. Id. at 363-64. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found
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Even so, the ADA was held to be an invalid and unconstitutional
abrogation of sovereign immunity.' 17 Initially the Court sought to
determine the scope of the constitutional right at issue. 18 Utilizing the
recent Kimel decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined precedent
involving the states' treatment of the disabled in the context of the Equal
Protection Clause to come to a conclusion. 9 Placing primary reliance
on City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,120 the majority found that
states need only justify discriminatory action toward the disabled with a
rational state interest. 121
After defining the constitutional right at issue, the Court moved to
determine whether Congress had identified a history of state employment
discrimination against the disabled. 122 Upon examination of the relevant
legislative history, the majority found no evidence that Congress had
based its legislation on a discernable pattern of unconstitutional behavior
by the states. 123
The majority concluded by applying the Boerne congruence and
proportionality test.124 In an analysis consisting of only one paragraph,
the Court ruled that the ADA did not satisfy the Boerne test. 125 In
closing, the majority stated that "to uphold the Act's application to the
States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law
laid down in Cleburne. Section Five does not so broadly enlarge
congressional authority."' 126 This language suggested that the next statute
to be analyzed, the FMLA, would similarly fail in its abrogation goal.

unequivocal intent in the statement from 42 U.S.C. § 12202 that provided: "A state shall
not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States

from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of
this chapter." Id. at 364.
117. Id. at 374.
118. Id. at 365. Chief Justice Rehnquist began by reminding all involved of the
"long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define
the substance of constitutional guarantees." Id. at 365 (citing City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 at 5 19-24 (1997)).
119. Garrett,531 U.S. at365.
120. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
121. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that
disability-based classifications, like age-based classifications, need only satisfy the
deferential rational basis test to be a valid exercise of state authority. See Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
122. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (the Court was looking for a "history and pattern"
of discrimination).
123. Id. at 370-72.
124. See id. at 374.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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C. The Family Medical Leave Act. Preventing Unconstitutional
Gender Discriminationin Employment Leave
1.

The FMLA Itself: Principles and Purposes

The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993127 is Congress's attempt to
eliminate gender-based discrimination in the area of employment
leave.128 The FMLA provides eligible employees 129 a right to twelve
weeks of leave in any twelve month period.1 30 The language of the
statute evidences Congress's specific intent to abrogate state sovereign
131
immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment.
The legislative history of the FMLA contains abundant evidence
that Congress was acting to reduce the burden on families engendered by
recent economic and societal change. 132 Specifically, Congress cited
numerous studies suggesting that women continued to enter the
workforce at rising rates, and that many families relied on income from
caregivers to survive. 133 In addition, Congress heard heart-wrenching
testimony from individuals whose lives had been negatively impacted by
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
128. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4). The purpose of act is to balance needs of family
with workplace in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
129. An "eligible employee" is one who has been employed for at least twelve
months and worked at least 1,250 hours in the previous twelve months. 29 U.S.C.
§ 261 l(2)(A)(i)-(ii). However, federal employees and employees of smaller (less than 50
employees) employers are excluded from the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 261 l(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Leave is provided for the following reasons: care for a
newborn child, care for recently adopted child, care for child, spouse or parent of
employee if they have a serious health condition, and where the employee him or herself
has a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D).
131. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(4)(A)(iii), 2617(a)(2); see also Nev. Dep't of Human
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-26 (2003). The Act provides that an action to recover
damages "may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). "Public
Agency" is defined in Title 29 as "the government of a State or any political subdivision
thereof... a State, or a political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(x),
2611 (4)(A)(iii).
132. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-3 at 4, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6. "Private
sector prac-ices and government policies have failed to adequately respond to recent
economic and social changes that have intensified the tensions between work and
family." Id.
133. Id. at 5-7. The General Accounting Office reported that the female labor force
increased by almost 1 million workers per year over the last forty years. Id. at 5. Further,
"The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that by the year 2005 the female labor force
participation rate will reach 66.1[%]." Id. The Senate report goes on to state that
"Mothers' employment is often critical in keeping their families above the poverty line."
Id. at 6.
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34

the lack of available leave. 1
35
The FMLA is written to allow leave regardless of gender.'
According to evidence before Congress, in child-rearing situations, men
were offered leave far less frequently than women. 136 Congress
specifically included both men and women under37 the coverage of the
FMLA to avoid potentially discriminatory results.1
Finally, the legislative history of the FMLA shows that a
congressional review found inconsistent coverage in the leave policies of
several states. 38 Against the backdrop of legislative history relating to
gender discrimination, the courts of appeals split in applying the
"heightened
scrutiny"' 39 standard to the recently-decided Section Five
140
holdings.

2.

Split Opinions: Can the FMLA Break the Mold?

a.

The Fifth Circuit: Abrogation is Invalid Under the FMLA

Following the recent Supreme Court Section Five decisions,' 4' the
Fifth Circuit ruled that the FMLA was an invalid abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. 142 In Kazmier v. Widmann, 143 the Fifth Circuit was

faced with a suit brought against Louisiana by a female employee of the
134. See id. at 7-12. The Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism
heard evidence, for example, from an Atlanta woman who had lost her job of five years
after giving birth to her first child because she took advantage of the company's vacation
and maternity leave time. Id. at 8. Testimony was also heard from individuals who lost
their jobs as a result of adopting children, caring for children with serious illnesses,
caring for elder parents or spouses, and those employees who required leave to recover
from their own illnesses. Id. at 9-12.
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 ("eligible employees" are entitled to leave).
136. See S. REP.No. 103-3 at 14-15, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17. A June
1990 Bureau of Labor Studies survey found that 37[%] of employees in private
businesses with 100 or more workers were covered by unpaid "maternity leave," while
only 18[%] were covered by unpaid "paternity leave." Id.
137. Id. at 16. "A law providing special protection to women or any defined group, in
addition to being inequitable, runs the risk of causing discriminatory treatment." Id.
138. See id. at 20-21 (outlining the various state laws).
139. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000); see also United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
140. Compare Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
FMLA had invalidly abrogated state immunity), with Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273
F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the FMLA represented a valid federal abrogation
of state immunity).
141. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
142. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526, 529.
143. 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).
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state department of social services who had been terminated for failure to
report to work. 144 The plaintiff-employee45 claimed that the termination
violated several provisions of the FMLA.1
The Fifth Circuit identified the Kimel146 decision as providing the
"clearest guidance" for determining the validity of the FMLA in light of
Section Five. 147 After defining the applicable legal standard, the court
moved on to separately view the congruence and proportionality of
subsections (C) and (D) of the FMLA 148 as they "clearly authorize leave
149
on different substantive grounds."'
According to the Fifth Circuit, subsection (C)150 was intended to

prevent private sector employers from discriminating against men in
granting leave.'15
The court recognized that cases of gender
discrimination are subject to "heightened" scrutiny, and, as such,
Congress "potentially" has latitude to enact broad prophylactic
legislation. 152 The court found, however, that Congress failed to identify
a pattern of discrimination by the states, and, as a result, subsection (C)
53

was not validly enacted pursuant to Section Five.'

Subsection (D) 154 does not at all address gender discrimination
according to the Fifth Circuit. 155 Instead, the court viewed this

144. Id. at 522-23. Ms. Kazmier took leave in 1995 for several weeks and for several
reasons: one month in May after breaking her arm, a week in October to care for an ailing
parent, and the final two months of 1995 after breaking her wrist. See id.
145. Id. at 523.
146. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
147. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 524. The court went on to describe the two part test for
determining congruence and proportionality that emerges from the Kimel decision. See
id. The first step involves determining the constitutional right at issue. See id. "If
legislation 'prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than
would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection ...standard'
the legislation will not be considered congruent and proportional." Id. (quoting v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000)). The second Kimel step involves reviewing the
legislative history of the statute to determine if Congress identified an actual pattern of
constitutional violations by the states. See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 524. The Fifth Circuit
viewed this step as incisive in order to prevent Congress from restraining constitutional
state behavior on the basis of "perceived constitutional bogeymen." Id.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), (D) (2000).
149. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Twelve month leave is provided "[i]n order to care
for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son,
daughter, or parent has a serious health condition." Id.
151. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
152. Id. at 526.
153. Id.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Twelve month leave is provided "[b]ecause of a
serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the
position of such employee." Id.
155. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 527.
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subsection as seeking "to prevent employers from discriminating on the
'
Since disability-based discrimination is
basis of temporary disability."156
only subject to the "slightest scrutiny," FMLA subsection (D) prohibits

substantial constitutional state behavior and is an invalid exercise of
Section Five abrogation authority.1 57 The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
158
the Kimel precedent can be described as very narrow and rigid.
b.

The Ninth Circuit: The FMLA is Congruent and Proportional

The Ninth Circuit, disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit, held in Hibbs
v. Department of Human Resources,1 59 that the FMLA was a valid
exercise of Congress's Section Five abrogation power. 16 The Ninth
Circuit agreed that the proper precedential rule was derived from
Kimel. 16 1 According to the Ninth Circuit, however, Kimel does not
always require evidence in the legislative
history of an identified pattern
162
behavior.
state
unconstitutional
of
Instead, the court took a more holistic view of the history of gender
discrimination in the workplace to find that Congress's abrogation action
was valid.163 In the alternative, the court held that the legislative history
of the FMLA did contain substantial evidence of gender discrimination
by the states in the granting of employment leave.164 This Ninth Circuit
decision, seemingly at odds with Section Five precedent, was appealed to
the Supreme Court and resulted in the May 2003 Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs 65 decision.

156. Id. The court also stated that the provision sought to prevent discrimination
against women on the basis of "pregnancy-related disability as well." Id.
157. Id. at 528-29. The court also based its subsection (D) holding on its opinion that
Congress had again failed to identify an actual pattern of state discrimination. Id. at 529.
158. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
159. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001).
160. Id. at 858, 873.
161. Id. at 856-57.
162. Id. "Examination of the Legislative history is merely one means by which a
court can determine whether the broad prophylactic legislation under consideration is
justified by the existence of sufficiently difficult and intractable problems." Id. at 857.
163. See id. at 858. The Ninth Circuit took the view that as the result of the history of
invidious gender discrimination and the "heightened" scrutiny applied to such
discrimination, the burden should be on the challenger of the statute to prove that the
states had not engaged in discrimination, and not the reverse. Id. at 857-58.
164. See id. at 858-59. The court cited the 1990 Bureau of Labor Statistics study
relied upon by the Congress as part of the requisite evidence. Id. at 859 (citing S. REP.
No. 103-3 at 14-15, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17).
165. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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Analysis
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs: State Sovereign
Immunity is Validly Abrogated by the FMLA
1.

The Decision Itself: Redefining the Scope of Section Five

Chief Justice Rehnquist penned the majority opinion, resolving the
dispute among the circuits, and setting out a new path for legislation
allowing private suits against the states. 166 In Hibbs, the Court was again
faced with a statutory provision that attempted to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. 167 The existing precedent seemed to suggest that
168
the FMLA was doomed to fail as an invalid abrogation of immunity.
The Hibbs Court held, however, that the FMLA was congruent and
proportional, and, as such, a valid congressional application of Section
69
Five.1
The plaintiff in Hibbs, a man who worked for the department 17
of0
human resources welfare division, sued Nevada under the FMLA
claiming that the state had improperly denied him leave and had
subsequently terminated him. 171 The District Court granted the State of
Nevada's summary judgment motion finding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the suit, and that the plaintiffs Fourteenth
Amendment rights had not been violated. 172 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, 173 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "whether
an individual may sue a state for money damages in federal court for a
74
violation of § 2612(a)(1)(C)."1
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion by citing
Garrett and Kimel, to reassert the fundamental importance of

166.
167.

See id. at 724, 738-40.
Id. at 724-26 (describing the substantive and enforcement provisions of the

FMLA).

168. See supra notes 92-126 and accompanying text.
169. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-40.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
171. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724-25. William Hibbs, the plaintiff, sought leave to care for
his wife who was recovering from a car accident and surgery. Id. at 725. The
Department had granted his original request for twelve weeks of FMLA leave to be taken
between May and December 1997 as needed. Id. Mr. Hibbs did not return to work after
August 5, 1997, and, after informing him that his leave had expired, the Department
terminated him in November, 1997. Id.
172. Id. at 725.
173. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 858 (9th Cir. 2001).
174. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003).
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federalism. 175 Congress's abrogation power was recognized next, along
with the finding that Congress had made 76its intent to abrogate state
immunity unmistakably clear in the FMLA.1
The majority opinion went on to identify the Section Five
"enforcement" power as broader than the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. 177 Under Section Five, Congress may prohibit
some
178
behavior.
unconstitutional
prevent
to
conduct
constitutional
The majority next cited Kimel and Boerne to reiterate that the
congruence and proportionality test is the proper instrument for
determining the validity of a congressional enforcement action pursuant
to Section Five. 179 The FMLA "aims to protect the right to be free from
gender-based discrimination in the workplace.' 8 ° State sponsored
gender discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny, and will not
stand unless the discrimination serves important state interests and the
means are substantially related to achieving such interests. 181 The Court
then moved to determine whether Congress
had adequate evidence of
82
patterns of unconstitutional state behavior.'
According to the majority, Congress had sufficient evidence before
it showing that states relied on discriminatory stereotypes in the
administration of employment leave.' 83 The Court cited two Bureau of
175. See id.at 726. "For over a century now, we have made clear that the
Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting
states." Id. (also citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
176. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726-27. "The clarity of Congress'[s] intent here is not fairly
debatable." Id. at 726.
177. Id. at 727-28.
178. See id.at 728-29. Chief Justice Rehnquist also took this opportunity to repeat
that "Congress may not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
power over commerce." Id. at 727 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54). The Chief
Justice was responding to a congressional attempt in the FMLA to base abrogation on
both Section Five and the Commerce Clause. See id.at 727 n.I.
179. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728. Valid Section 5 legislation must exhibit "congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end." Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
180. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
181. See id.at 728-29 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
182. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-33.
183. Id. at 730, 737. "Reliance on such stereotypes cannot justify the States' gender
discrimination in this area."
Id. at 728-29 (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
Interestingly, the Chief Justice began his discussion of evidence before Congress by
reviewing the long history of state laws limiting women's employment history, along
with the supporting Supreme Court precedents. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-30. This
introduction would seem to suggest that the Court has softened its view on where the
judiciary may look to find evidence of state discrimination. See id. The use of historical
fact and previous precedent seems to fall in line with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
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Labor Statistics surveys and various testimonies before Congress
showing that males received requested leave far less frequently than
females. 184 Many pieces of the legislative history cited by the majority
were not before the 103rd Congress, however, and were not part of the
direct legislative history of the FMLA.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist
defended his use of this evidence as foundational, in that it provided
Congress with a common understanding
of the problems of gender
86

discrimination in the workplace.1
Finally, according to the Court, there was evidence before Congress
that even facially nondiscriminatory state laws were applied in a
discriminatory manner. 87 Further, the Court reported that the few states
with recently enacted leave initiatives fell far short of the necessary,
nondiscriminatory standards.' 88 Of course, the Court reached opposite
89
conclusions regarding the evidence before Congress in previous cases,1
and, as a result, the majority moved to distinguish the current analysis of
the FMLA from prior precedent. 190
The Court primarily relied on the different levels of scrutiny
afforded to the different discriminatory classifications in order to draw

Kimel allowing the court to view gender discrimination as a whole, instead of limiting
itself to the legislative history. See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 857
(9th Cir. 2001).
184. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (citing S. REP. No. 103-3 at 14-15, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 16-17). While this evidence related to the private sector, the Chief
Justice connected the results to the states by citing a fifty-state survey also before
Congress that provided that the leave policies available in the public sector differed little
from the private sector. Id. at 730 n.3 (citing The Parentaland Medical Leave Act of
1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations and the
Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, Director of the Yale Bush Center
Infant Care Project)).
185. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731 n.4 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-28, pt. 1, p. 30
(1989)).
186. Id. at 731 n.5. "Evidence pertaining to parenting leave is relevant here because
state discrimination in the provision of both types of benefits is based on the same gender
stereotype: that women's family duties trump those of the workplace." Id. The Chief
Justice cited to evidence before various committees considering both The Parental and
Medical Leave Act of 1987 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Id. at 731 nn.4-5.
187. See id. at 732.
188. See id. at 733-34. Seven states provided childcare leave for women only, twelve
states provided no leave beyond initial childbirth, adoption, or to care for a seriously ill
family member, and many of the remaining states offered no guaranteed leave at all. See
id. In the Court's opinion Congress could find that such programs would do little to
combat the discriminatory stereotypes about the roles of males and females in the
workplace and family. See id.
189. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
190. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-40.
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the distinction. 191 The Garrettand Kimel cases involved age-based and
disability-based discrimination, meaning that a state would only have to
show some rational basis to validate its actions. 192 Therefore, in such
cases, Congress is forced to not only identify discrimination of the
elderly or disabled, but also to find a "widespread pattern of irrational
reliance on such criteria."' 93 The FMLA, however, seeks to prevent
gender discrimination, a classification which must survive heightened
scrutiny. 194 Because discrimination based on gender must satisfy more
than a rational basis test to be deemed constitutional, "it was
easier for
' 95
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations."'
In addition, the Court referenced previous unsuccessful
congressional attempts to remove gender discrimination from the
workplace to support the holding that the FMLA is congruent and
proportional. 96 The history of gender discrimination, taken as a whole,
provided Congress with ample evidence of the necessity of the remedial
measures contained in the FMLA.' 97 The Court also found significant
98
the narrow target and substantial limitations contained in the FMLA.1
For the first time, the Court, using the above reasoning, held a statute
abrogating state sovereign immunity under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment congruent and proportional.' 9 9
2.

Viewing the Hibbs Decision as Inconsistent with Prior
Precedent

The Hibbs opinion appears to be an anomaly when compared with
previous Supreme Court decisions on Section Five and Commerce

191.

See id. at 735-37

192. Seeid. at 735.
193. See id. (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89). The Court did not find a showing of a
widespread pattern of reliance on discrimination in the context of either the ADEA or the
ADA. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; Garrett,531 U.S. at 368.
194. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
195. Id. The Chief Justice compares this decision with previous decisions concerning
racial classifications-a type of discrimination that is presumptively invalid. See id.
(citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-13 (1996) (upholding the
Voting Rights Act of 1965)).
196. Id. at 737. The majority saw Title VII and the Title VII amendment, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as unsuccessful attempts at resolving the "difficult and
intractable problem." Id.
197. See id. at 737-38.
198. See id. at 738-39. According to the Court, the FMLA, unlike the ADEA or
ADA, only applies to "the fault line between work and family-precisely where sexbased overgeneralization has been and remains strongest-and affects only one aspect of
the employment relationship." Id. at 738.
199. Id. at 740.
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Clause abrogation. 2°° To reach the holding in Hibbs, Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied on numerous pieces of evidence showing that Congress
had a proper foundation for Section Five abrogation.20 ' Much of the
evidence relied upon by the majority, however, came from outside the
legislative history of the FMLA.20 2 The use of material outside of the
direct legislative history of the statute seems antithetical to previous
precedent.2 °3
In Kimel, the Court limited its search for evidence before Congress
to the legislative history of the ADEA.20 4 Similarly, when searching for
evidence before Congress in the Garrett case, the Court looked only to
the legislative history of the ADA, and not to the general history of state
discrimination against the disabled.20 5 Even more striking is the fact that
the Hibbs majority relied almost entirely on evidence garnered from the
private sector.20 6

In Hibbs, the Court connected the evidence of private sector
discrimination to the public sector in a footnote describing a fifty-state
survey presented to Congress seven years before passing the FMLA, a
survey that concerned a different statute.20 7 Yet in both Kimel and
Garrett the Court invalidated the statutes at issue because Congress
200. See Vikram D. Amar, The New "New Federalism": The Supreme Court in Hibbs
(and Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 351 (2003). Professor Amar argues that the Hibbs
decision contains at least three major methodological contradictions. Id. First, Amar
points to the fact that the Hibbs court relies on evidence of private sector discrimination
to make its determination. Id. The professor finds only one explicit reference to state
behavior; a reference that, at most, implicates eleven states. Id. at 351-52. Second, the
Court uses evidence from other statutory provisions to show that Congress had the proper
foundation to legislate. Id. at 353. And third, Professor Amar points to the result of
Hibbs, that innocent states will be subject to the prophylactic legislation. Id. at 354. The
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, expressly prohibits the regulation of
innocent states. See id.
201. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-32. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional
participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of
leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation."
Id. at 735.
202. See, e.g., id. at 731 n.5 (relying on testimony before the 100th Congress related
to The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987).
203. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (limiting
view of evidence to direct legislative history of Title I of the ADA).
204. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-91 (2000). "A review of the
ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals that Congress had virtually no reason
to believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against
their employees on the basis of age." Id. at 91.
205. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-74. The majority refused to consider "anecdotal
accounts" of disparate treatment relied upon by the dissent. See id. at 370-71.
206. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-32.
207. See id. at 730 n.3. The fifty-state survey was presented to the 99th Congress
considering the Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986. Id. According to the survey,
public practices in granting leave differed little from private practices. See id.
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The right at issue may
lacked direct evidence of state discrimination.
be the distinguishing factor that allows these seemingly irreconcilable
decisions to be read together.2 °9
B.

Reconciling the Hibbs Decision as a New Piece in the Federalism
Puzzle

Perhaps Hibbs is not inconsistent with prior precedent, but only
represents a new branch in the tree of federalism. The Hibbs decision
could be viewed as representing a shift in the burden of proving Section
Five constitutionality.21 ° Where alleged state discrimination reaches the
core of the Fourteenth Amendment, when such classifications are
"presumptively invalid" or generate greater than rational basis
scrutiny," the burden of proof rests not with Congress, but with the state
claiming immunity.
This shift in the burden of proof seems to make sense in the
federalist regime, based on the relative ease with which the Court allows
Congress to find a pattern of discrimination. 2 When the classification
at issue can be defended by a state through identification of a rational
basis, Congress is required to discover a "widespread pattern" of state
discrimination. 213 Where, however, the classification would be reviewed
under heightened scrutiny, it will be "easier for Congress to show a
pattern of state constitutional violations. 21 4 The Court does not
specifically identify how easy it would be for Congress, but the result in
Hibbs seems to suggest that if Congress can show some gender or race
discrimination, the burden will fall upon the states to prove their actions
208. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 649-50; Garrett,531 U.S. at 370-71. In Kimel, the Court
specifically stated that an "argument that Congress found substantial age discrimination
in the private sector ...is beside the point. Congress made no such findings with respect
to the states." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 649. The Court refused to extrapolate the private sector
findings to support a determination of public sector discrimination. See id.
209. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (describing the heightened standard of review
afforded gender discrimination).
210. See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2001). The
Ninth Circuit contrasts the Hibbs case with Kimel and Garrett by referencing a
"rebuttable
presumption
of unconstitutionality
for state-sponsored gender
discrimination." Id. at 855. According to the Ninth Circuit, the burden is on the state in
cases of gender discrimination to show that their actions are non-discriminatory. Id. at
855-56.
211. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-38 (discussing classifications requiring more than
mere rational basis review).
212. Seeid. at738.
(describing the Kimel and Garrett decisions).
213. See id.
214. Id.The Court points to its decision upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as
evidence of a similar result because racial discrimination is also presumptively invalid.
See id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-13 (1966)).
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constitutional.1 5
If this theory does reflect the future of the Court's Section Five
analysis, it suggests some practical advice for all of the players involved
in the federalism game. The Congress that wishes to exert its abrogation
power under Section Five is well-advised to couch the legislation in
terms of a classification that would be reviewed under more than a
rational basis review. On the other hand, states that desire to avoid
losing sovereign immunity will be better off arguing that legislation is
not combating unconstitutional discrimination, rather than bickering
about the evidence before Congress. Fundamentally, however, the Hibbs
decision is likely to affect only the narrow band of cases where a suspect
classification implicating the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is

involved.
IV. Conclusion
The decision in Hibbs will not create a stir among the general
public. In the end, it is likely that very few involved in the legal
profession will even give the case more than a passing glance. And yet,
a shift in the balance of power between the two sovereigns in our
federalist system would affect the rights of each and every citizen in this
Republic.
The current Supreme Court has often acted to constrain the
monolithic federal government from encroaching on what is left of the
states' authority. The Hibbs decision suggests, however, the existence of
a line in the sand the Court is not willing to cross. This Court is ready to
require more from a state challenging a congressional attempt to remedy
discrimination that implicates the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Perhaps the distinction between types of discrimination is an
artificial one. It is not likely to be much comfort to an individual who
faces state-sponsored age discrimination that fellow citizens
discriminated on the basis of gender can file actions. It seems that the
fundamental principle underlying any society governed by the rule of
law, that every right be afforded a proper remedy, is occasionally lost in
the fight to save federalism.

215. But see Amar, supra note 200, at 353. Professor Amar believes that
distinguishing on the basis of the right at issue "cheats a bit on the key issue." Id. Amar,
referring back to the congruence and proportionality test, states that identifying a more
stringent standard of review does not tell us how often the states are violating
constitutional rights. Id. Professor Amar sees the ultimate number of states in violation
of the Constitution as the lodestar in determining the validity of a Section Five
abrogation. Id. It is important to note that the Professor is not arguing that the Court is
right or wrong, but only that it is inconsistent. See id. at 351-54.

